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PLAYING DOCTOR: WHO CONTROLS THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE?
The health care industry has changed dramatically over recent
decades.1 The autonomy that physicians once enjoyed in making
health care decisions and rendering medical treatment 2 has been
' See William R. Trail & Susan Kelley-Claybrook, Hospital Liability and the Staff
Privileges Dilemma, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 315, 252-53 (1985) (discussing changes in health
care industry); Troyen A. Brennan, Ensuring Adequate Health Care for the Sick: The
Challenge of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome as an Occupational Disease, 1988
DUKE L.J. 29, 29-69 (same); Theodore R. Marmor et al., A New Look at Nonprofits: Health
Care Policy in a Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 343 (1986) (same).
2 See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93-94 (N.Y. 1914)
(hospital had no right of control over physician because professional skill and learning ren-
dered physician independent contractor), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
In Schloendorff, the court distinguished between administrative and medical acts and lim-
ited the hospital's liability to administrative acts, which do not require medical judgment.
Id. at 132. Moreover, the court held that a charitable hospital is shielded from liability for
the actions of its employed physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients because as
licensed professionals they were regarded as independent contractors. Id. at 131-32, 135; see
also Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 445-47 (1988) (physicians have essentially
controlled practice of medicine since beginning of century). See generally ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE (1970) (discussing pro-
fessional autonomy and dominance over performance of health care in United States and
noting legally supported monopoly over medical practice).
The nature of medical work has always required independent professional judgment.
See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 162-64 (1970). "[J]udgment as such cannot be
objectified because it is at least in part a matter of opinion: it would not be wise to create
formal codes or rules placing one opinion, theory, or school over another." Id. at 162; see
also Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (Ct. App. 1971). In Carmichael, the court
stated that "[t]he physician's services depend upon his skill and judgment derived from his
specialized training, knowledge, experience and skill." Id.
In Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1016 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1966), the court held that
[olnly the treating physician can determine what the appropriate treatment
should be for any given condition. Any other standard would involve intolerable
second-guessing, with each case calling for a crotchety Doctor Gillespie to peer
over the shoulders of a supposedly unseasoned Doctor Kildare. The diagnosis and
treatment of a patient are matters peculiarly within the competence of the treat-
ing physician.
Id.; see also Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (Colo. 1944) (corporation hospital power-
less to direct doctor's medical actions as it is not licensed to practice medicine); Iterman v.
Baker, 15 N.E.2d 365, 370 (Ind. 1938) (corporation or licensed individual may not control
manner and means of physician's performance of his professional duties, nor may a physi-
cian accept such direction), overruled by Harris v. YWCA, 237 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. 1968);
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severely curtailed by increased governmental intervention,3 the
fear of malpractice litigation,4 and the growth in contract and cor-
porate medical practices.5 In reaction to the increasing public con-
cern over health care costs, hospitals have also exerted greater con-
trol over the manner in which treatment is rendered.6
Consequently, while courts have acknowledged the diminishing
control of physicians over treatment decisions,7 the increase in hos-
Brown v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 226 N.Y.S. 317, 321 (3d Dep't 1928) (hospital corporation may
not interfere with physician's "independent judgment," diagnosis, or method of treatment).
Indeed, hospital administrators would violate many state medical practice acts if they exer-
cised control over a physician's discretionary medical judgment in the treatment of patients.
See Joel D. Cunningham, Comment, The Hospital Physician Relationship: Hospital Re-
sponsibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385, 392 (1975).
s See infra notes 17, 21-26 and accompanying text.
See infra note 31 (autonomy threatened by institutional accountability arising from
expanded malpractice liability).
" See Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An
Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 455-58 (1987)
(organization of contract and corporate medical practice by business viewed as threat to
autonomy of independent physicians). After the Civil War, corporations in the railroad,
mining, and lumber industries contracted with independent physicians to render medical
services to employees. Id. at 456 & n. 70. In addition, practitioners' services were marketed
directly to the public through for-profit medical service companies for a fixed rate each
month. Id. at 456-57. The contract and corporate practice arrangements included manage-
ment review of the fee structure, length of hospital stay, and required second opinion before
surgery, shifting a degree of physician control to corporate management. Id. at 456. As or-
ganized health services and contract medicine policy decisions increasingly were made by
nonprofessional individuals, physician autonomy diminished, giving rise to "myriad con-
cerns" within the medical profession. Id.
6 See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. 1984) (quoting Arthur F. Southwick,
The Hospital as an Institution: Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship with
the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429, 431-35 (1973)). The Washington Supreme Court
observed that the "community hospital has evolved into a corporate institution, assuming
'the role of a comprehensive health center ultimately responsible for arranging and coordi-
nating total health care.'" Id.; see also Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944)
(hospitals today have evolved into highly integrated health care centers).
The doctrine of charitable immunity has gradually eroded as hospitals have come to be
viewed as profit centers operated by private corporations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 895(E) (1965 & Supp. 1977); see also President & Directors of Georgetown College
v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (landmark case viewing hospital as corpora-
tion and abolishing doctrine of charitable immunity).
Compare Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781, 783-84 (E.D. Va. 1977)
(21-day limitation on Medicaid funding for hospital stays reasonable because it does not
control physicians' decisions) and Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267, 275 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (subjecting attending physician's recommendation to retrospective review by in-
surer not violative of public policy).with American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 395 F.
Supp. 515, 523-24 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (issuing preliminary injunction against Medicaid regula-
tions because of chilling effect of conditioning reimbursement on committee's 24-hour re-
view of medical necessity of admission). Generally, however, the passing of control from the
community practitioner to the boards and administrators of hospitals is widely acknowl-
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pitals' control over the selection, manner, and method of doctors'
services8 has resulted in a trend imposing greater liability on hos-
pitals for the actions of physicians using their facilities.9
Until recently, hospital liability for a physician's negligence
arose solely under the theory that an employer was accountable for
the conduct of its agent, servant, or employee,10 and an exemption
from liability existed for the acts of physicians characterized as in-
dependent contractors." However, recognizing the increase in the
edged. See FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 112-13.
' See Yeargin v. Hamilton Memorial Hosp., 171 S.E.2d 136, 139 (Ga. 1969) (hospital's
authority to restrict physician's practice and to allow doctor unlimited use of privileges not
limited by physician's license), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970); see also Dunbar v. Hospi-
tal Auth. 182 S.E.2d 89, 93 (Ga. 1971) (physician could be barred from practicing medicine
in facilities operated by Hospital Authority if doctor did not comply with hospital regula-
tions); Gregory T. Perkes, Case Note, Medical Malpractice-Ostensible Agency and Corpo-
rate Negligence-Hospital Liability May Be Based On Either Doctrine of Ostensible Agency
Or Doctrine of Corporate Negligence, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 551, 570-71 (1986) (courts recog-
nizing modern hospitals' increased need to monitor and control physician's treatment of
patients within hospital rising because courts have imposed vicarious liability and duty not
to terminate care on hospitals). But see Hall, supra note 2, at 528-32 (state licensing laws
and ingrained custom have slowed intra-institutional power shifts from medical staff to
hospitals).
9 See Arthur F. Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLEv. MAR. L. REV.
146, 146-49 (1968) (noting strong tendency of courts to place responsibility on hospital as
institution for negligent acts of professional individuals). Susan B. Koehn, Note, Hospital
Corporate Liability: An Effective Solution to Controlling Private Physician Incompetence,
32 RUTGERS L. REV. 342, 358-59 (1979) (jurisdictions finding right to control in relationship
between physician and hospital beyond that of master-servant). See generally Southwick,
supra note 6, at 436-40 (in addition to hospital's obligation to monitor medical outcomes is
expanding authority to control quality of prescribed medical care).
"o See Koehn, supra note 9, at 356-60 (liability of hospitals initially limited to negligent
physician acting within scope of employment). See generally Merton Ferson, Bases for
Master's Liability and for Principal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REV. 260
(1951) (discussing employer's liability under legal doctrines in master-servant and principal-
agent relationships).
" See H. Ward Classen, Hospital Liability for Independent Contractors: Where Do
We Go from Here?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 469, 473-74 (1987) (hospital generally not vicariously
liable for physician who is independent contractor); see also Hill v. St. Clare's Hosp., 490
N.E.2d 823, 827 (N.Y. 1986) (hospital liability for malpractice of employee not extended to
treatment by independent physician); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Curry, 3 S.E.2d 153, 158
(Va. 1939) ("attending" physician as independent contractor assumes accountability by con-
tract for professional judgment in treating patient).
An independent contractor is "one who makes an agreement with another to do a piece
of work, retaining in himself control of the means, method and manner of producing the
result to be accomplished, neither party having the right to terminate the contract at will."
Heffner v. White, 45 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942); see also Classen, supra, at 474-
80, 483-88 (discussing increasing willingness of courts to impose hospital liability for inde-
pendent contractor physicians under new agency theories); infra notes 47-51 and accompa-
nying text.
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degree of control exercised by a hospital in administering medical
care,12 several jurisdictions have expanded the scope of hospital li-
ability under a corporate negligence theory. 3 Recently, in Thomp-
son v. Nason Hospital,4 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania fur-
ther extended this theory of liability to circumstances where the
treatment was rendered by a non-employee staff physician over
whom the hospital had no control.'0
This Note will discuss how today's heightened economic con-
cerns and increased hospital control over a physician's professional
conduct has led to an expanded theory of corporate hospital negli-
gence. Part One will discuss recent external controls that infringe
upon the autonomy of the physician and increase a hospital's role
in the treatment of patients. Part Two will review the changes in
the nature and theories of hospital liability concurrent with their
changing role in treatment decisions. Finally, Part Three will con-
sider the legal and financial ramifications of extending hospital lia-
bility at the expense of qualitative health services.
I. EXTERNAL CONTROLS ON THE MEDICAL FIELD
The shift in the control of treatment decisionmaking from
physicians to hospitals is a result of a changing health care envi-
,2 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Charles Perrow, Goals and Power Struc-
tures, in THE HOSPITAL IN MODERN SOCMIY 119, 124-39 (Eliot Freidson ed., 1963) (recogniz-
ing increased administrative power in hospitals over doctors, internal administration, and
network of organizations involved with health care).
13 See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258-61 (Ill.
1965) (recognizing doctrine of hospital corporate liability which imposes on hospital nondel-
egable duty of care to patient separate from that of private physician), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 946 (1966). In Darling, the basis for liability was the hospital's failure to fulfill a duty
owed directly to the patient. Id. When a hospital is not held liable for the tortious conduct
of private physicians granted staff privileges, it may lack the incentive to supervise the med-
ical care. See Paul E. Williamson, Notes, Medical Malpractice-An Unwarranted Operation:
The North Carolina Supreme Court Excises the Doctrine of Hospital Corporate Negli-
gence, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 825, 833 (1988). Several jurisdictions have expanded hospi-
tal liability in order to correct this situation by adopting the concept of corporate negli-
gence. See Jim M. Perdue, Direct Corporate Liability of Hospitals: A Modern Day Legal
Concept of Liability for Injury Occurring in the Modern Day Hospital, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 773,
776-80 (1983) (examining organizational structure of hospital and evolution of corporate
negligence). But see James B. Cohoon, Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hos-
pital Liability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 383, 400-01 (1980) (corporate hospital liability disre-
gards realities of medical practice, making adoption of doctrine unsound).
" 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
" See id. at 708; see also infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing
Thompson).
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ronment fueled by economic considerations. 16 Specifically, govern-
mental funding regulations, 7 the structure of health care net-
works, 18 and the proliferation of malpractice litigation 9 have
eroded the physician's professional autonomy and have increased
the necessity of hospital control.20
18 See Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Tradi-
tional Relationships, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1071, 1077-81 (financial health developments rework
hospital-physician relationships because of such influences as prospectively determined pa-
tient payment systems, increased numbers of physicians, increased antitrust litigation by
physicians denied admitting privileges, and expansion of legal doctrine allowing for hospital
liability). Increasing cost restraints are diluting the Hippocratic ideal that "all care should
be provided that is of any conceivable benefit, regardless of the cost." See Hall, supra note
2, at 435-38. For example, the Medicare prospective payment system based on diagnosis
related groups that has been implemented in hospitals has caused hospital administrators to
increase their monitoring of physician medical care. See J. Timothy Philipps et al., Meeting
the Goals of Medicare Prospective Payments, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (1985); see also
Symposium, The Dark Side of Health Care Containment Emerging Legal Issues in Man-
aged Care, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 1 (1990). "During the past several years, the financing
and delivery of health care in the United States have been dramatically altered due to sub-
stantial changes in the economy of the market place." Id.
1' See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text; see also 138 CoNG. REc. E269-01 (daily
ed. Feb. 11, 1992). Congress considered comprehensive health care plans because of urgent
need for market reform; this year 14% of gross national product will be spent on health care
and yet 36 million Americans will be without coverage. Id. In an effort to reduce Federal
health care spending, the Honorable James A. McDermott of Washington has introduced
the State-Based Comprehensive Care Act of 1992, which authorizes funding to support a
state health care plan that "provides for the development and implementation of appropri-
ate cost-control mechanisms, which may include insurance market reforms, medical mal-
practice liability reforms, managed care plans, low income cost-sharing protections" and
meets "appropriate standards as established by the State." Id. It is submitted that if the
State-Based Comprehensive Care Act of 1992 is enacted, the Government Funding Plan will
further infringe on the physician's professional autonomy by delegating the establishment of
the standard of medical care to the state.
18 See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
See Symposium, Hospitals and the Disruptive Health Care Practitioner-Is the In-
ability to Work With Others Enough to Warrant Exclusion?, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 377, 377-82
(1985). The legal climate towards health care has diluted the physician's dominance over
medical treatment decisions as federal and state regulatory schemes, expanded theories of
hospital liability, and legal developments have become involved in the health delivery sys-
tem. Id. It appears that practitioners have "lost control of what used to be their sacred and
familiar territory. In a very short span of years, the legal system has moved from a posture
of benign indifference about health matters, to an attitude of active intervention in all as-
pects of health care delivery." Id. at 379; see also Kenneth R. Wing, American Health Pol-
icy in the 1980's, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 608, 635-39 (1986) (physician's treatment deci-
sions directly impact overall medical costs because significant portion of services delivered
in hospitals are ordered by doctors). In an effort to contain costs, the response has been
changes in hospital administration and the growth of alternative delivery systems that may
"dilute the traditional autonomy of physicians; their role in determining who gets what kind
and what level of service may be thereby reduced." Id. at 636.
1992]
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For example, in Rust v. Sullivan,2 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that Department of Health and Human Services regulations
prohibiting title X physicians 22 from discussing information con-
cerning abortion as a method of family planning did not impermis-
sibly infringe on the doctor-patient relationship. The majority
held that "[tihe financial constraints that restrict an indigent wo-
man's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected
freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions
on access to abortion, but rather of her indigency."' 4 By upholding
the direct regulation of dialogue between a pregnant woman and
her doctor, the Court restricted a physician's ability and obligation
to provide a full range of information, medical alternatives, and
professional advice to the patient.2 5 Consequently, hospitals receiv-
ing government funding are forced to exert greater control over the
substance of a physician's treatment advice in order to protect
those funds.26
In addition, the structure of employer-sponsored health plans
has increased hospital control. Corporate health care networks
establish fee structures and regulate referrals between doctors as
well as the nature of tests and procedures which will be compen-
21 ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
22 Public Health Service Act, § 1008, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970), amended by 42 U.S.c. §§
300-300a-6 (1988). The Public Health Services Act authorizes the Secretary to "make grants
to and enter into contracts with public or non-profit private entities to assist in the estab-
lishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range
of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services." 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)
(1988). Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act states that "[nione of the funds ap-
propriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of
family planning." Id. § 300a-6.
2' Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
24 Id. at 1778 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
22 Id. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent vigorously objected to the Gov-
ernment's attempt to control a physician's professional judgment and dialogue with a wo-
man. Id. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent feared the effect of such a restric-
tion and warned that governmental regulations which "'confine the attending physician in
an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession,' cannot en-
dure." Id. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)).
28 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
'7 See Lisa Belkin, Doctors View Health Plans As Eroding Their Autonomy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at Al, B6. An increasing number of employers are participating in
health care networks in an effort to contain rising hospital costs in a weakened economy. Id.
As a result, more individuals are enrolling in the network and more doctors are feeling com-
pelled to join because of financial necessity. Id.
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sated.28 Thus, hospitals are imposing more restrictive guidelines
that attempt to maximize compensation. 2  However, while these
group-practice prepayment structures achieve substantial savings
for the participating corporations, the medical treatment rendered
has become less individualized."
Finally, the threat of malpractice litigation has resulted in in-
creased control of decisionmaking by hospitals in an attempt to
insulate themselves.31 Courts have imposed greater liability on hos-
pitals in order to reflect their participation in the decisionmaking
32process. Accordingly, courts have created a corporate negligence
theory for hospitals to buttress traditional theories of hospital
liability.33
28 Id.; see also Robert F. Blomquist, Health Maintenance Organizations and State
DRG Hospital Cost Control Programs: The Need for Federal Preemption, 10 Am. J.L. &
MED. 1, 5-7 (1984) (noting such comprehensive health service systems monitor enrollees'
hospital length of stay, require annual prepayment fees, integrate physicians' practices and
facilities, and compensate physicians on non-episodic bases).
2 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
20 See Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis,
84 HARv. L. REv. 887, 921-27 (1971). Prepaid group practice plans have provided strong
incentives to minimize costs. Id. For example, the comprehensive benefits offered by these
networks appear to reduce a patient's incentive to hospitalize and serve as a disincentive to
doctors to recommend hospitalization. Id. at 923-24. As physicians' remuneration is in-
versely proportional to allocable hospital services, the incentive to economize has resulted in
decreased medical costs. Id. at 925. However, this "reversed financial incentive" system to
economize might interfere with the independent, professional medical decision of the physi-
cian and potentially undermine the appropriate care of the patients. See Philip C. Kissam &
Ronald M. Johnson, Health Maintenance Organizations and Federal Law: Toward a The-
ory of Limited Reformmongering, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1163, 1180-83 (1976). But see Chase-
Lubitz, supra note 5, at 480 ("HMO's cost-control incentive ... translates into better health
for HMO members" because "HMO's find it more profitable to keep members healthy by
treating them during the early stages of illness when treatment is less expensive"). The
patient-doctor relationship may also deteriorate as physicians become increasingly con-
trolled by employers and network governing boards. See id. at 480-81. Further, the clinical
services offered by these plans foster an impersonal atmosphere that may erode the tradi-
tionally individualized nature of the doctor-patient relationship thereby affecting the qual-
ity of care. See Kissam & Johnson, supra, at 1181.
21 See Hall, supra note 2, at 457-61 (expanded hospital malpractice liability imposing
institutional accountability for patient care intrudes upon domain of physician's treatment
authority). However, "[d]espite the courts' overwhelming acceptance of the concept of direct
institutional responsibility for patient care, they have resisted essentially any expansion of
institutional authority." Id. at 460.
22 See Southwick, supra note 6, at 452-53 (legal developments holding hospital liable
for failing to monitor quality of treatment rendered by doctors have increased).
11 See infra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
II. THEORIES OF HOSPITAL TORT LIABILITY
Tort law imposes liability on individuals who unreasonably in-
terfere with the rights of others.3 4 The primary purposes for impos-
ing liability for tortious conduct have been to compensate the in-
jured party35 and to provide an incentive to prevent the occurrence
of similar harm.3 6 The endeavor to find a standard of reasonable
care to use when imposing liability on hospitals requires the courts
to balance the conflicting rights and obligations of the parties
against the interests of society.3 7 Traditionally, hospital tort liabil-
ity was founded on principles of negligence, which require the exis-
tence of a duty, breach of that duty, proximate cause, and injury
before culpability can attach.3 8 The theories under which a hospi-
tal may be subject to tort liability are respondeat superior, ostensi-
ble agency, and more recently, the corporate negligence doctrine.3 9
3' W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th
ed. 1984).
"' See id. § 4, at 20. The primary function of tort law is the allocation of losses and
compensation for injuries arising out of human activities. Id. at 20-23; see also Cohoon,
supra note 13, at 398-99 (imposing liability on hospitals compensates plaintiff for negligence
of physicians).
" See KEETON ET AL., supra note 34, § 4, at 25-26. In addition to compensation, the
field of torts is concerned with providing an incentive to prevent future injury and punish-
ing the wrongdoer. Id.; see also Cohoon, supra note 13, at 398-99 (imposing liability on
hospitals provides incentive for hospitals to act with reasonable care); Perkes, supra note 8,
at 573 (holding hospital liable for physician's misconduct creates strong inducement for as-
suring competent medical care); Gregory G. Peters, Note, Reallocating Liability to Medical
Review Committee Members: A Response to the Hospital Corporate Liability Doctrine, 10
AM. J.L. & MED. 115, 121-22 (1984) (imposing liability on hospitals is response in part to
low quality of medical treatment, theorizing hospital is in best position to control physician
incompetency).
" See KEETON ET AL., supra note 34, § 3, at 16; see also Koehn, supra note 9, at 388
(conflicting social interests must be weighed to decide extent of liability imposed on hospi-
tals for quality of medical treatment administered by independent staff physicians).
38 KEETON ET AL., supra note 34, § 30 at 164-65; see also Reynolds v. Mennonite Hosp.,
522 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ill. App. Ct.) (requiring finding that breach of duty by hospital was
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries in order to impose liability), appeal denied, 530
N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 1988); Hansen v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 632 P.2d 504, 505 (Wash.
1981) (listing essential elements of actionable negligence).
11 See Note, Theories for Imposing Liability upon Hospitals for Medical Malpractice:
Ostensible Agency and Corporate Liability, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 561, 568-78 (1985)
(courts have moved away from traditional rule of non-liability of hospitals and applied tort
law theories to impose upon hospitals duty of care to patients); see also Jeffrey S. Leonard,
Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital To Prevent Physicians' Malpractice, 15 ARIz. L.
REV. 953, 953-54 (1973). Courts and legislatures have recognized that the contemporary real-
ities and needs of our society have not been addressed by the traditional analyses of the
hospital-patient relationship. Id. at 953. This has resulted in an "increased recognition of a
duty owed by hospitals to their patients with respect to the quality of medical care offered,
[Vol. 66:425
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A. Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
In holding an employer vicariously liable for the negligent acts
of an employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior,40 courts
have utilized a right-of-control test which determines whether an
individual was an employee based upon the right of the employer
to control the individual's work.4 ' Historically, the right-of-control
test barred the application of respondeat superior to hospitals, vis-
a-vis physicians, based upon the belief that the practice of
medicine required a unique skill: a doctor's independent, profes-
sional judgment and freedom to make clinical decisions.42 With the
even in the absence of a master-servant relationship between the physician and the hospi-
tal." Id. at 954.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, "a master is subject to liability for the torts
of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958). Traditionally, hospitals were liable for the administe-
rial acts but not medical acts of its personnel. See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8-9 (N.Y.
1957) (negligence of nurse resulting in injury to patient during surgical procedure imputed
to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior). The court in Bing observed that a hospi-
tal was a place that administers medical treatment through its staff. Id. Thus, the court
abandoned the distinction between administerial and medical acts, and applied the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Id. at 666; see also William H. Payne, Recent Developments Affect-
ing a Hospital's Liability for Negligence of Physicians, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 389, 390-94 (1977)
(most states impose liability on hospitals for negligence of physician committed within scope
of employment).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the foundation of the ostensible agency
doctrine and provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another
which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by
the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm caused by
the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the same extent as
though the employer were supplying them himself or by his servants.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965); see also Seneris v. Haas, 291 P.2d 915, 926-
28 (Cal. 1955) (en banc) (hospital held liable for negligence of anesthesiologist resulting in
patient's paralysis under doctrine of ostensible agency); Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen.
Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 432-34 (Mich. 1978) (expressly recognizing ostensible agency theory
of liability as applied to hospitals); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649-50
(Pa. 1980) (per curiam) (doctrine of ostensible agency involves hospital "holding out" to
patient that medical treatment rendered is by physician employed by hospital).
40 See supra note 39.
41 See Newton County Hosp. v. Nickolson, 207 S.E.2d 659, 662 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974). A
hospital is liable for injuries sustained by a patient during treatment rendered by a physi-
cian if the doctor is employed as a servant. Id. The test is whether the employer has the
"[r]ight to direct the time, the manner, the methods, and the means of the execution of the
work." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Banks v. Ellijay Lumber Co., 200 S.E. 480, 481 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1938)); see also Reynolds v. Swigert, 697 P.2d 504, 508 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (right
of hospital to control work of doctor determined whether physician is independent contrac-
tor or employee on basis of respondeat superior).
42 See Symposium, supra note 16, at 6-7.
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increasing availability of hospital malpractice insurance, courts re-
jected the exemption from respondeat superior, and eliminated the
distinction between medical and administrative acts by imposing
liability on hospitals for all services performed by their employees
within the scope of employment.4 However, a critical distinction
was made between employee-physicians and independent
practitioners.44
Courts have held that an independent staff physician is not an
employee of a hospital, and therefore the hospital is not legally
responsible for the negligence of such a physician.45 Furthermore,
while a hospital merely provides the necessary equipment and ser-
vices to care for the patient and has no right to exercise control
over the private physician's performance, the duty to provide a
reasonable level of care rests solely with the independent
practitioner.4
Notable exceptions to this independent practitioner rule in-
volved situations where the risk of negligent treatment was fore-
seeable by the hospital,47 where the health care provider con-
'3 See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 7 (hospitals protected against financial loss from litigation
with easily obtainable insurance). In Bing, the court determined that the medical acts as
well as the administrative acts of a physician could be imputed to the hospital based on the
practitioner's employment status. See Symposium, supra note 16, at 7; see also Cohoon,
supra note 13, at 401 nn.106-07 (hospital's insurance coverage generally greater than that of
independent physician and consequently viewed as best strategic target for ensuring
recovery).
" See Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 849 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The Stewart court
enunciated eight factors to use as evidence of a hospital's control over a physician: (1) the
right to direct the work; (2) whether the physician contracted to administer a service or to
complete a task; (3) the employer's right to control the time of the work; (4) the employer's
authority to inspect the work; (5) who provides the equipment; (6) the power to end the
contract; (7) the degree of skill of the worker; and (8) the method of compensation. Id.
"8 See, e.g., Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538, 542 (D.D.C. 1972) (hospital not liable
for negligence of private staff pediatrician rendering treatment to minor where independent
skill and judgment used), afl'd, 494 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
41 See, e.g., Moore v. Carrington, 270 S.E.2d 222, 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (hospital not
liable for malpractice of attending physician who is independent contractor); Hundt v. Proc-
tor Community Hosp., 284 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (surgeon in private practice
who is active member of hospital staff has independent relationship with hospital and is
liable for own misconduct); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299-300 (N.Y. 1967) (neg-
ligence of patient's privately retained physician who simply uses hospital facilities not im-
puted to hospital because it may not interfere with doctor's medical decision).
4 See, e.g., Heddinger v. Ashford Memorial Community Hosp., 734 F.2d 81, 85-86 (1st
Cir. 1984) (hospital liable for negligent delay of treatment by attending physician where risk
was clearly foreseeable "whether the doctors were employees of [hospital] ... or were, as the
hospital asserts, independent contractors"); Fiorentino, 227 N.E.2d at 299 (hospital held
liable where it knew malpractice action would occur by independent practitioner).
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tracted to provide a particular medical service,48 where the hospital
represented the physician to the public as its agent,4 9 or where the
corporate facility's duty to the patient was considered nondelega-
ble.50 Under this framework of exceptions, a trend in favor of im-
posing legal responsibility on a hospital for the actions of indepen-
dent staff physicians has emerged.5 1
B. Doctrine of Ostensible Agency
In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between
the hospital and the physician, an increasing number of jurisdic-
tions have adopted the theory of ostensible agency under which
hospital liability is imposed for the malpractice of an independent
contractor physician whom the patient reasonably believes to be
under the hospital's authority.52 This doctrine has been applied to
establish the existence of an agency relationship between a hospi-
tal and an emergency room physician where the hospital has held
itself out as a full-care facility.53
Under the theory of ostensible agency, a patient treated in an
emergency room has no duty to inquire as to the physician's con-
tractual status since the patient generally draws no distinction be-
tween the corporate entity and its staff.5 4 Thus, where the hospital
places the independent contractor in a position where a reasonable
" See, e.g., Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55, 58-59 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.) (hospital liable for independent contractor physician's negligent diagnosis and
treatment under estoppel theory since hospital contractually undertook to provide emer-
gency room services), petition denied, 422 So. 2d. 842 (Fla. 1982); Giusti v. C.H. Weston
Co., 108 P.2d 1010, 1012-15 (Or. 1941) (hospital association not shielded from liability where
hospital employed independent contractor physician to perform its contract with high
school).
" See supra note 39; infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
50 See supra note 39; infra text accompanying notes 56-80.
See generally Classen, supra note 11, at 472-73 (discussing courts' increasing willing-
ness to hold hospitals vicariously liable for independent contractor physicians).
82 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
5' See, e.g., Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256-58 (Ky. 1985) (hospital
liable for negligence of non-employee physician who rendered emergency room treatment to
patient who looked to hospital for medical care); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d
527, 528-30 (3d Dep't 1976) (where emergency room physician under contract with hospital
failed to administer blood to patient in time, hospital liable for doctor's negligence because
it controlled manner in which doctor operated emergency room and held itself out to public
as facility for emergency treatment).
8 See Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 432-35 (Mich. 1978) (os-
tensible agency theory applied in holding that patient suffering pain has no duty to make
inquiry regarding employment status of treating physician when patient looks to hospital
for medical treatment).
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person would believe that the physician has the authority to act,
liability will be imposed on the institution for the physician's neg-
ligence based on the doctrine of ostensible agency.5
C. Doctrine of Corporate Negligence
A number of jurisdictions have expanded the scope of a hospi-
tal's liability to include the negligent acts of independent staff
physicians under the theory of corporate liability or corporate neg-
!igence.56 This doctrine has its genesis in Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital.5 7 In Darling, the court held that
the hospital owed an independent, nondelegable duty of care di-
rectly to its patients to ensure that physicians practicing within its
facilities were competent.5 The Darling court's corporate responsi-
bility theory redefined a hospital's legal obligation toward its pa-
tients by holding that a hospital may independently be held re-
sponsible for an injured patient's treatment.5 9
The view espoused in Darling has been accepted in many
American jurisdictions.6 0 State courts adopting the Darling ap-
proach have based their application of corporate liability on sev-
eral underlying duties which a hospital owes a patient."1 The du-
ties identified by the courts, each of which limit a hospital's
responsibility to situations involving foreseeable and preventable
risks, have been: (1) the duty to use reasonable care in maintaining
the facility and furnishing medical equipment; 2 (2) the duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care in selecting and retaining competent medical
staff; 3 (3) the duty to provide the proper overall supervision of the
" See supra note 39.
'e See id.
57 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
58 Id. at 257. Although the court acknowledged a separate duty of care, it stopped short
of defining that duty by merely stating that it is "both desirable and feasible that a hospital
assume certain responsibilities for the care of the patient." Id.; see supra note 39.
Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
so See Havighurst, supra note 16, at 1079.
6 See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., South Highlands Infirmary v. Camp, 180 So. 2d 904, 907 (Ala. 1965) (hospi-
tal liable for patient injuries proximately caused by defective equipment it furnished for use
in patient treatment); Bellaire Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Campbell, 510 S.W.2d 94, 97-98 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1974) (liability imposed on hospital for breaching duty to patient to maintain properly
functioning oxygen supply).
63 See, e.g., Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ga. 1972) (hos-
pital has duty to exercise reasonable care to investigate background of physician permitted
to serve on its staff); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 163-71
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quality of patient care services;64 and (4) the duty to promulgate
and enforce medical rules and policies to ensure the quality of pa-
tient care.65
Implicit in each of these underlying obligations has been the
threshold requirement of actual or constructive knowledge and
proximate cause of compensable harm.66 In addition, compliance
with guidelines established by the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals,67 the hospital's bylaws, " and general licensing
(Wis. 1981) (hospital owes duty to patient to conduct proper credentials investigation before
permitting staff privileges to independent physicians).
" See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 343 (Ariz. 1972) (hospital liable for
breach of duty to supervise staff where hospital has knowledge of professional incompe-
tence); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396-97 (N.C. Ct. App.) (hospital owes duty to patient
to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee medical treatment), cert. denied, 269
S.E.2d 621 (N.C. 1980).
(1 See, e.g., Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446, 454-56 (D.S.C. 1968) (hospital
liable for breaching duty to formulate, adopt, and enforce rules where patient injured by
hospital's failure to require consultation regarding possible appendicitis); Air Shields, Inc. v.
Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 581-82 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (hospital liable for negligence in its
policies and regulations concerning administration of oxygen to premature infants).
66 See Reynolds v. Mennonite Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 827, 829-30 (111. App. Ct.) (absent
knowledge of incompetence of physician or proof of proximate cause of patient's injury,
hospital not liable for surgeon's misdiagnosis of patient's condition), appeal denied, 530
N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 1988); see also Perkes, supra note 8, at 572 ("liability has been premised on
the hospital's failure to oversee the care of its patients and ensure their safety since the
hospital either knew or should have known of these negligent acts"); Lisa R. Rohm, West
Covina and Its Progeny: Have the California Courts Barricaded the Avenue of Relief Pro-
vided for Victims of Hospital Corporate Negligence?, 22 CAL. W. L. REV. 317, 324 (1986)
(for plaintiff to prevail in action for breach of hospital's independent duty of care, "a plain-
tiff must show that the defendant hospital's negligent selection or retention of an incompe-
tent staff physician caused the plaintiff harm").
17 See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS 94 (1984) [hereinafter JCAH]. The JCAH promulgates national standards of op-
erating criteria for hospitals which are voluntarily adopted by hospitals seeking to acquire or
retain accredited status. Id. at xvi; see also Gary F. Loveridge & Betsy S. Kimball, Hospital
Corporate Negligence Comes to California: Questions in the Wake of Elam v. College Park
Hospital, 14 PAC. L.J. 803, 807 (1983) (accreditation by JCAH nearly as important as being
licensed). The standards place emphasis on the selection/retention process, delineation of
staff privileges, and periodic appraisals of each physician staff member. See Koehn, supra
note 9, at 369-70. Therefore, the standards could be used to determine whether the hospi-
tal's conduct is fulfilling its duty of care to patients. Id.; see also Pederson v. Dumouchel,
431 P.2d 973, 979 (Wash. 1967) (enunciating standard of care under JCAH for corporate
hospital negligence).
68 See Purcell, 500 P.2d at 341 (hospital's own bylaws relevant in defining its legal obli-
gation toward patient for medical treatment rendered); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 171
(Wash. 1984). In Pedroza, the court maintained that "[hiospitals are required by statute
and regulation to adopt bylaws" to govern medical staff functions, and because "bylaws are
based on national standards . . their use in defining a standard of care for hospitals is
appropriate." Id.
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standards"' has enabled hospitals to fulfill their duty of care to pa-
tients according to defined standards, and has also provided for
regulated supervision of medical practices and procedures.70
Because jurisdictions have imposed corporate hospital liability
on health care facilities based on different underlying duties, no
clear boundaries have emerged to define the scope of the corporate
practice of medicine. 71 While some courts view corporate negli-
gence as no more than an application of common law tort analy-
sis, 72 other courts treat corporate liability as a novel doctrine upon
which to base hospital responsibility.73
A recent trend broadening the scope of the corporate negli-
gence doctrine includes a duty to monitor, oversee, and control the
ongoing medical treatment rendered by a non-employee staff phy-
sician.74 Moreover, liability has been imposed on a hospital for the
unfavorable consequences of medical care prescribed by an inde-
pendent contractor physician.75  Specifically, in Thompson v.
Nason Hospital,7 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
lower court's broad construction of the doctrine of corporate negli-
gence which imposed liability "for [the] adverse effects of treat-
ment ... approved by doctors although the doctors were not em-
ployees of the hospital. '77 Justice Flaherty, in a strong dissent,
argued that the application of corporate negligence was no more
than a deep-pocket theory of legal responsibility applied to hospi-
tals holding them liable as "guarantors of the quality of care af-
09 See Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1984) (statutory
schemes establishing comprehensive peer reviews assure public "that medical practices and
procedures within the State are being closely monitored and reviewed"), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1027 (1985). Additionally, hospital licensing regulations enable a hospital to fulfill its
duty to use reasonable care in selecting qualified physicians. Id. at 394.
70 See Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 170-71 (under corporate negligence doctrine, hospital's duty
of reasonable care should be defined and guided by both accreditation standards of JCAH
and hospital's bylaws).
" See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text; infra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
7' See, e.g., Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 457 (N.C. 1987)
(corporate hospital negligence based on principles of respondeat superior and agency law).
71 See, e.g., Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 168-70 (expressly adopting doctrine of corporate negli-
gence as enunciated by other jurisdictions to hospitals in Washington, acknowledging role of
hospital as corporate entity makes institution responsible for quality of health care
rendered).
71 See Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 706-08 (Pa. 1991); see also infra notes
76-78, 80 and accompanying text (detailed discussion of Thompson).
' Thompson, 591 A.2d at 706-08.
76 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
" Id. at 706.
[Vol. 66:425
PLAYING DOCTOR
forded by independent staff members." '
It is submitted that such an overbroad adoption of corporate
liability has sidestepped the fundamental tort law premise that a
duty requires some degree of knowledge. In the absence of a clearly
defined duty, the imposition of liability thrusts tort law into the
area of evaluating a doctor's professional judgment with the bene-
fit of hindsight only, subjecting the hospital to liability for neither
foreseeing nor preventing the risk of injury.79 Such a burden ex-
ceeds the realm of corporate negligence as established in Darling."
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF AN OVERBROAD APPLICATION OF
CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE
Extending a hospital's liability to acts performed by a private
physician in the exercise of independent professional judgment
and exposing the hospital to liability for unforeseen injurious re-
sults thwarts the purpose of tort liability.8 1 Instead of serving as an
incentive for hospitals to prevent the occurrence of negligence, this
view of corporate liability compels hospitals to act as guarantors
against patient injuries.82
71 Id. at 709 (Flaherty, J., dissenting); infra note 82.
" See Stogsdill v. Manor Convalescent Home, Inc., 343 N.E.2d 589, 612 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) (absent knowledge of foreseeable harm, hospital neither liable for acts of malpractice
of physicians granted staff privileges nor required to second guess and constantly monitor
activities of its physicians).
80 See Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 256-58 (corporate liability applied where attending physi-
cian was employee placed on emergency room duty and subject to supervision). Subsequent
decisions by the Illinois appellate courts have constricted the holding in Darling, rejecting
the imposition of liability upon hospitals except for their own negligence. See, e.g., Reynolds
v. Mennonite Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 827, 829-30 (Ill. App. Ct.) (recognizing specific and narrow
factual basis of corporate negligence, and holding that unless occurrence of malpractice fore-
seeable, no duty exists to monitor ongoing medical care provided by staff physician), appeal
denied, 530 N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 1988); Pickle v. Curns, 435 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(recognizing that although hospital owes duty of reasonable care to patient for known condi-
tion, hospital is not insurer).
S, See generally Cohoon, supra note 13, at 398-401 (placing liability on hospitals that
lack knowledge to enable them to recognize or prevent occurrence of future malpractice
thwarts objective of imposing tort liability).
82 See Thompson, 591 A.2d at 709-10 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). "The opinion of the
majority adopts an entirely new concept of liability, i.e., 'corporate liability,' to be applied to
hospitals in order to hold them liable as guarantors of the quality of care afforded by inde-
pendent staff members." Id. at 709 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). It is submitted that the court,
in hindsight, should not impose liability on a hospital for the failure to intervene in the
doctor/patient relationship when there is no clearly known or foreseeable risk of injury to
the patient and no evidence in the record that the physician on staff was incompetent to
perform the procedure in question.
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Public policy does not require a hospital to act as an insurer
for all treatment rendered on its premises," and to assume that
such a policy exists would constitute an unprecedented deviation
from existing tort law.84 Far-reaching ramifications would result
from such a broad application of the theory of corporate liability."5
Expanded liability would increase hospital insurance and adminis-
trative costs, resulting in higher costs to the public for medical ser-
vices. " In addition, hospitals suspecting inadequate service within
their institutions and wishing to act would encounter an array of
legal barriers 7 that would ihwart administrative efforts to react,
and ultimately to render timely supervision.8 In essence, hospitals
would find themselves torn between the popular mandate of pro-
viding cost-effective professional -services and the significant in-
crease in costs that would accompany the supervision and control
of qualified physicians. 9
CONCLUSION
The hospitals' increased control of the manner in which a doc-
tor renders treatment has also broadened their exposure to liability
for the actions of their physicians. Traditional tort doctrine has
". See Peters, supra note 36, at 128-38.
"' See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
85 See Thompson, 591 A.2d at 709-10 (Flaherty, J., dissenting); infra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text.
8 See Koehn, supra note 9, at 378-79; Thompson, 591 A.2d at 709 (Flaherty, J., dis-
senting). This new concept of liability "reflects a deep pocket theory of liability, placing
financial burdens upon hospitals for the actions of persons who are not even their own em-
ployees." Id. "At a time when hospital costs are spiraling upwards to a staggering degree,
this will serve only to boost health care costs that already too heavily burden the public."
Id.
87 See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 930 F.2d 334, 335-36 (3rd Cir. 1991) (hospital facing
disciplinary action against staff physician may face protracted litigation by physician based
on legal theories such as antitrust, due process, and civil rights); Gordon v. Lancaster Osteo-
pathic Hosp. Ass'n, 489 A.2d 1364, 1368-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (counter legal forces al-
ready in place restrain hospitals from acting hastily).
88 See David J. Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of the Hospital
Practices?, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 452, 462-65 (1978). "In applying a variety of theories by
which hospitals may be held liable for the acts of independent physicians, courts repeatedly
have overlooked conditions which may make the imposition of such liability anomalous." Id.
at 465. "A hospital's administration may be placed in the position of knowing of a doctor's
incompetence but not having enough proof to remove him." Id.; see also Ascherman v. St.
Francis Memorial Hosp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (Ct. App. 1975) (substantively, hospitals
must act reasonably in denying/terminating physician's staff privileges).
8" See Diane M. Janulis & Alan D. Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You
Don't: Hospitals' Liability for Physicians' Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REv. 689, 708-17 (1985).
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been expanded to include a new theory of liability for hospitals
based on corporate negligence. However, the extension of corporate
negligence to the negligent acts of a non-employee physician, with
no requirement that the hospital have knowledge or control of
these acts, unnecessarily expands the scope of hospital liability.
The application of the corporate negligence doctrine should be lim-
ited to those situations in which a hospital can foresee that a doc-
tor using its facilities is utilizing treatment methods that deviate
from standard medical care and can control the physician's
activities.
Linda B. Johnston

